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Summary 
Each year there are a number of aircraft accidents related to weight and balance issues.  Such 
accidents have occurred due to for instance incorrect loading of the aircraft and the use of wrong 
takeoff weight for performance calculations amongst others. The present paper gives a review of 
weight and balance related accidents that have occurred with commercial aircraft worldwide 
since 1970. Furthermore weight and balance related incidents as reported by airlines are 
analysed for the period 1997-2004. Factual information, causal factors, and trends of weight and 
balance related accidents and incidents are analysed using the data sample. Finally the influence 
of technologies such as onboard weight and balance systems is discussed. 
 
The conclusions made in the present study are: 
 
• The risk of having a weight and balance related accident with cargo flights is 8.5 times 
higher than with passenger flights; 
 
• There are various factors involved in weight and balance accidents/incidents such as errors 
in the load sheet, shifting of cargo, incorrect loading etc. No single factor could be 
identified in the present study that had a very dominant influence;  
 
• Large regional differences in the weight and balance related accident rate are identified. 
The African region showed the highest accident rate and the North American region the 
lowest; 
 
• Worldwide the weight and balance related accident rate shows a slow improvement since 
1970. Nevertheless the accident rate has reduced by all most 50% in 35 years; 
 
• The amount of time spent on training of weight and balance related items are often limited 
both for flight crew as well as with ground agents; 
 
• Automatic onboard aircraft weight and balance systems could resolve most of the weight 
and balance problems identified in the present study. However the accuracy and reliability 
of such systems is currently insufficient to enforce the use of these systems on commercial 
aircraft as primary means for determining the weight and balance. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
“On March 12, 1950, an Avro 689 Tudor V was on a charter flight carrying rugby fans home 
from Dublin, Ireland. The aircraft was approaching runway 28 at Llandow Airport located near 
Cardiff at an abnormally low altitude from the North-East with the air-carriage down. This 
rapid loss of height was evidently of concern to the pilot, who at one-third of a mile from the 
runway and approximately 150-200 feet above the ground, slightly increased the engine power 
to maintain height. This was followed by a sudden application of full power and the aircraft 
pitching up. Climbing to about 300 ft. the aircraft finally stalled and the aircraft fell sharply to 
starboard and plunged into the ground, narrowly missing a farm and a couple of young boys 
playing football, some 2,500 ft. from the runway threshold. Only 3 out of the 83 persons 
onboard survived the crash. The investigation revealed that the aircraft was not loaded 
correctly resulting in a centre of gravity which was at least 9 ft. aft of the aft limit. After 
selecting landing flaps the aircraft became unstable, pitched up and stalled. The investigation 
showed that the loading instructions pertaining to the aircraft were unsatisfactory as it did not 
contain adequate directions in determining how passengers and their luggage should be 
distributed. For this particular trip there was an alteration in the seating arrangement to allow 
six more passengers than the maximum permissible. This change required an amendment of the 
certification status of the aircraft. The loading of the aircraft was not in accordance with the 
provisions of this amendment.” (Source: NLR Air Safety Database) 
 
The accident described above took place more than 55 years ago. Still today accidents with 
exactly similar causes related to weight and balance as found in the above described accident 
occur. Weight and balance refer to the weight of an aircraft and the location of the centre of 
gravity. Aircraft are designed and certified to operate within certain weight and balance limits. 
Exceeding these limits can be dangerous. Unfortunately each year a number of accidents and 
serious incidents take place in which the aircraft involved exceeded the weight and balance 
limits or in which weight and balance issues affected the flight adversely. In this research paper 
such occurrences are studied in more detail.  
 
1.2 Objectives and scope 
The objective of this research paper is to provide insight into the safety factors that are related to 
aircraft involved in exceeding their weight and balance limits. The study is limited to 
commercial civil transport aircraft with a maximum take off mass exceeding 5,500 kg. 
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2 Certification and flight operational issues 
It is not the objective of this paper to provide a complete overview of all certification and flight 
operational issues regarding weight and balance. However, some background information could 
help in a better understanding of some of the safety factors to be discussed later in this paper. 
Therefore a brief summary of some of the important issues on certification and flight operations 
are discussed next. 
 
Regulations such as provided in FAR 25, EASA CS 25 specify the design criteria that shall be 
conformed to in determining the allowable centre of gravity and weight limits (see e.g. FAR 
25.27 and EASA CS 25.27). These criteria determine the stability, controllability, and strength 
requirements at all allowable centre of gravity positions and corresponding weights. The 
forward centre of gravity limit is typically determined by control requirements and the aft 
position by stability requirements. These requirements are discussed in more detail next. 
 
Normally, the condition which typically determines the forward centre of gravity limit is that 
the aircraft shall be controllable in landing. This means that the aircraft shall be able to be 
trimmed at the high lift values required for the desired landing speeds (including the abuse case 
of Vref-5 knots). Other flight control cases that can influence the forward limit of the centre of 
gravity are the capability to make a prompt avoidance pitch-up manoeuvre, the capability to 
make a prompt nose-down recovery at low speed and adequate pitch control in abnormal 
configurations (failure cases). The above mentioned conditions all apply to the case in the free 
air. On the ground the forward centre of gravity limit is basically determined by the maximum 
loads on the nose landing gear.  
 
Static longitudinal stability is the most important factor in determining the aft centre of gravity 
limit. At the aft centre of gravity limit position the aircraft should demonstrate that a positive 
natural stability exists, that the aircraft is capable of pitch control at low speeds and high thrust 
(e.g. during a go-around), and that an adequate control is possible in abnormal configurations 
(failure cases such as fuel that is trapped in the trim tank). On the ground the aft centre of 
gravity limit is determined by the minimum loads on the nose landing gear required for good 
nose wheel steering, the maximum loads on the main landing gears, the tipping tendency of the 
aircraft and adequate directional control during the take off run after an engine failure. 
 
In the end all these requirements (which are only briefly discussed here) determine the envelope 
of allowable centre of gravity and weights during take off, landing and in flight. An example of 
such an envelope is shown in Figure 1 and can be found in the certified aircraft flight manual.  
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Figure 1: Example of a centre of gravity envelope 
 
During certification special attention is given to the take off trim setting and the so-called green 
band during certification. In this case the take off trim setting is limited in order to cover 
required abuse cases at take off. It has to be shown that the aircraft remains controllable 
throughout the take off run at the aft centre of gravity limit for take off and with the trim at the 
nose-up limit of the green band. Furthermore it should be possible to rotate the aircraft with no 
significant increase in the take off distance at the forward limit of the centre of gravity limit for 
take off and with the trim at the nose-down limit of the green band. 
 
The centre of gravity envelope used during the operation of an aircraft is not necessarily the 
same as the certified envelope. For a passenger aircraft operation it is not practical to determine 
the weight of each individual passenger including their hand luggage before departure. 
Regulations give standard values of the mass of a passenger that can be used instead of 
weighing each passenger. This approach however implies that operational margins have to be 
applied to the certified centre of gravity envelope. In determining the centre of gravity possible 
deviations from the assumed load distribution must be considered. As a result the operational 
centre of gravity envelope shows a more restrictive range in aft and forward centre of gravity. If 
free seating is applied (which is popular amongst many of the so-called low cost carriers), 
procedures must be introduced to ensure corrective action by the crew if extreme longitudinal 
seating selection occurs. For instance if in a half full aircraft all the passengers are seated at the 
last rows or at the front rows the crew should correct this seating. 
 NLR-TP-2007-153 
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What happens if the certified limits as defined in the centre of gravity envelope are exceeded? 
From design the aircraft flight characteristics will be adversely affected whenever the certified 
limits are exceeded. For instance as centre gravity limit moves aft, the aircraft will become less 
stable as the centre of gravity approaches the neutral point1). If the centre of gravity lies aft of 
the neutral point the coordination and control motions required to maintain a stable flight 
condition will exceed the capability of the pilot and the aircraft will become uncontrollable. On 
the ground, a centre gravity aft of the aft limit can result in a tail strike due to the pitch up of the 
aircraft (even at low speeds during the take off roll when power is applied to the engines). The 
effect of a centre of gravity position forward of the forward limit is evidenced by a decrease in 
elevator control capability. Because of excessive stability, the elevator control required to 
manoeuvre the aircraft is increased. At some point, elevator control might become insufficient 
to perform required manoeuvres, such as the flare during landing and a go-around. During take 
off the centre of gravity position can be moved forward until it reaches the point where the 
aircraft is very stable but cannot be rotated or with great difficulty because the elevator has 
reached its maximum deflection. An adverse centre of gravity position can also have significant 
effects on the loads imposed on the aircraft's structural components and could cause structural 
failure. Exceeding the maximum weights as specified in the aircraft flight manual does not 
necessarily affect the flight characteristics adversely. For instance exceeding the maximum 
landing weight could result in a landing gear collapse. However, the landing gear structure is 
designed with a standard safety margin assuming a higher load than obtained during a normal 
landing at maximum landing weight. With this it could be possible to land the aircraft somewhat 
beyond the maximum landing weight. Overweight landings are often made during emergency or 
precautionary landings. Exceeding the maximum take off weight will affect the flight 
performance characteristics. The take off ground roll distance increases and the climb 
performance reduces. As long as the overweight is not significant the aircraft should be able 
take off safely. However, the margins reduce rapidly when an engine failure occurs during an 
overweight take off, if the runway is short for the aircraft, or if there are high obstacles along the 
take off flight path that the aircraft has to clear. 
 
                                                     
1) The neutral point is the boundary between stable and unstable conditions around the pitch axis. 
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3 Analysis of occurrence data 
3.1 Accident data 
Searches were conducted in the NLR Air Safety database for accidents (as defined by ICAO 
Annex 13) that were directly related to weight and balance issues. The query was focused on 
those cases in which the certified weight and balance limits were exceeded. The search covered 
the time period 1970-2005 and encompassed civil transport aircraft with a take off mass of 
5,500 kg or higher, equipped with turbo jet/fan or turbo prop engines. Included were passenger 
and cargo flights. Excluded from the data sample were test flights, ferry flights, 
emergency/precautionary landings and occurrences related to sabotage or any other criminal act. 
 
The query resulted in 82 accidents that met the above mentioned criteria. There were 34 (41%) 
accidents with one or more onboard fatalities. The data sample comprises of 50 (61%) 
passenger flights and 32 (39%) cargo flights. These frequencies of flight types are not very 
meaningful unless they are related to the flight exposure of each flight type as many more 
passenger flights are conducted than cargo flights. With the NLR Air Safety database it is 
possible to calculate the exposure of civil passenger or cargo transport aircraft from 1970 and 
onwards. For the period 1970-2005 it is calculated that 7% of all revenue flights are full cargo 
flights and 93% of all revenue flights are full passenger2) flights. This means that the risk of 
having a weight and balance related accident is about 8.5 times higher with a cargo flight than 
with a passenger flight.  
 
The distribution of the flight phase in the data sample is shown in Figure 2. Clearly the take off 
phase is by far the most critical in weight and balance related accidents for both passenger and 
cargo flights accounting for more than half of all accidents.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
2) So-called combi flights in which the aircraft transports both passengers and cargo are considered here as full passenger flights 
as the same operational rules for real full passenger flights rules applies to these combi flights. 
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Figure 2: Flight phase distribution in weight and balance related accidents 
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Figure 3: Distribution of factors in weight and balance related accidents (percent of all factors 
per flight type) 
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Figure 4: Trend in the accident rate (passenger and cargo flights combined 
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rates per million flights
*not significant  
Figure 5: Accident rate by region (1970-2005) 
Figure 3 shows the factors that are involved in accidents related to weight and balance. A 
distinction is made between passenger and cargo flights in this figure. Although there are some 
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differences in the frequency of factors between passenger and cargo flights, some care should be 
taken when drawing conclusions from this as the data sample of factors is not always 
sufficiently large to do so. However still some observations can be made with confidence. 
Shifted (not secured) cargo is a factor that is often present in cargo flights and is much less 
observed in passenger flights. Exceedance of the aft centre of gravity limits occurs more often 
than exceedances of the forward limit. This applies to both passenger and cargo flights. 
Overweight take offs occur more often than overweight landings3). However there is no 
systematic difference between passenger and cargo flights when looking at overweight take offs 
and landings. 
 
In Figure 4 the trend in the accident rate is shown for the study period. Data from both 
passenger and cargo flights are combined to obtain a sufficient high statistical accuracy in the 
calculated rates. The data show that over the years the accident rate of weight and balance 
related occurrences has reduced by a factor two. 
 
In Figure 5 the distribution of the accident rate by world region is shown. It is clear from this 
figure that there exist large differences amongst the different regions regarding the accident rate. 
For reasons of statistical accuracy the whole study period studied is used to estimate the region 
rates. 
 
3.2 Incident data 
The NLR Air Safety Database contains a large set of airline safety reports obtained from more 
than 40 operators for the period 1998-2004. This database was also queried for weight and 
balance related incidents for the complete period covered in this database. Only the operational 
flight phases were considered (e.g. incidents when the aircraft was parked were excluded). It 
was not possible to distinguish between passenger and cargo flights in this set of data of the 
NLR Air Safety database. Some 1,200 weight and balance related incidents were found and 
analysed. Figure 6 shows the distribution of factors in the analysed incidents. 
 
                                                     
3) Emergency and precautionary landings in which the aircraft was overweighted are excluded in the present analysis. 
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Figure 6: Distribution of factors in incidents (percent of all factors) 
 
3.3 Discussion of results 
The results presented in section 3.2 clearly show that are number of basic factors involved in 
weight and balance related occurrences. Both the accident and incident data show similar 
factors. The standard method used for aircraft weight and balance control is based on the use of 
the load sheet. Before each departure a load manifest has to be prepared. This manifest has to be 
accepted and approved by the captain. The items that have to be considered in the load manifest 
are numerous and many different people are involved in setting it up. This leaves plenty of room 
for errors. When looking deeper into the data some interesting root causal factors are observed4). 
Typically causal factors are poor communication, time pressure, poor quality assurance within 
the ground agents’ organisation, lack of training of flight/cabin crew, lack of training of ground 
agents’ personnel and poor loading procedures. Communication in this case refers to the 
exchange of information on weight and balance issues between the flight crew and the ground 
agents, and within the ground agents’ organisation itself. For instance important information 
regarding the last minute changes to the cargo is not communicated correctly to the pilots, or 
changes to the cargo are communicated by phone only which can easily be misheard. The 
analysed data shows that there is a higher likelihood of making errors when an unfamiliar 
aircraft is loaded by the ground agent. Often the ground agent had no written procedures for 
                                                     
4) Unfortunately, not all analysed accident/incident reports contain such detailed information. However, it is believed that the 
underlying causal factors found apply to the majority of weight and balance related occurrences. 
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loading such an unfamiliar aircraft. The availability of unambiguous loading procedures is an 
important factor in avoiding loading errors. The amount of time spent on training of weight and 
balance related items are often limited both for flight crew as well as with ground agents. The 
data shows that better and more frequent training could help in avoiding weight and balance 
problems. 
 
The presented data in this study show that the risk of a weight and balance related occurrence is 
much higher for a cargo flight than for a passenger flight. This observation would not come as a 
surprise to many. The results from Figure 3 suggest that this is mainly the result of accidents in 
which shifted cargo, that was not secured properly, was a factor. This was the case in 40% of all 
cargo accident flights and only in 10% of the passenger flights. Furthermore many of the 
accidents related with cargo flights analysed here involved smaller airlines that operated in 
regions with a low safety performance in general5). These small cargo airlines were often found 
to have low standards and did not have a quality control system in place. Also the oversight by 
the regulators in some countries of these smaller cargo airlines and the ground agents was often 
found to be insufficient.  
  
In 7 accidents from the data sample the control was lost during the approach after selecting 
landing flaps followed by the initiation of power increase and/or a go-around. The aircraft 
involved were all turbo prop aircraft and had a centre of gravity very close to or aft of the aft 
limit for landing. The 7 accidents all show a very similar pattern which is briefly discussed in 
more detail. Lowering the flap will move the neutral point forward and changes the pitching 
moment (this effect is not limited to propeller aircraft only). The pilot feels this as a tendency 
for the aircraft to pitch up and needs to push forward on the control column to hold a steady 
flight path by lowering the elevator. The pilot will re-trim the aircraft by winding the trim wheel 
forward which moves the trim tab to keep the elevator in the new position without the pilot 
having to maintain a push force on the control column. One feature of propeller driven aircraft 
is that when the engines accelerate from idle power to full power, the neutral point moves 
forward (up to 10% of the mean aerodynamic chord!). When due to incorrect loading the actual 
centre of gravity position is close to or slightly aft of the certified aft limit, the aircraft may be 
just stable during take off and cruise. However this situation can change during landing in 
which the aircraft may become unstable after lowering the flaps to landing position and may 
show a very strong pitch up tendency. The normal reaction to increase power to recover from 
the pitch up or to make a go-around will make things even worse as the neutral point moves 
forward significantly with the increase in power on turbo prop aircraft.  
                                                     
5) Note that the (fleet) size of the operator itself was not identified as factor. 
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The change in the accident rate since 1970 shown in Figure 4 shows an optimistic trend. 
However the actual progress made in safety is rather small. For instance in the period running 
from 1980 to 1995, the accident rate remained nearly constant. Towards the end of the nineties 
rate started to drop again. It is difficult to say what has caused to this improvement. Most likely 
it is a combination of a number of factors.   
 
The differences in accident rates for the different world regions as shown Figure 5 are not a 
surprise. These differences in rates can also be observed when considering overall accident rates 
for these regions. Clearly, the African region is the most vulnerable regarding weight and 
balance accidents. Surprisingly this is not caused by cargo flights. Passenger flights are more 
often involved in weight and balance related accidents in the Africa region. 
 
3.4 Examples of some typically weight and balance related accidents 
In this section a number of examples of typical weight and balance related accidents are 
presented and discussed. 
 
Example 1: Overweight take off 
B727-200 (PP-LBY), Fly Lineas Aereas, Quito airport, Ecuador, 01/05/1996. (source: NLR 
Air Safety Database) 
During take off from runway 35 at Quito, the crew felt that the aircraft was not accelerating 
quickly enough and was not reaching the calculated V speeds. Therefore the crew elected to 
abort the take off at 120 knots (V1=143 knots). The runway was wet and the available runway 
length left to stop the aircraft was only 900 meters (3000 ft.).  The aircraft could not be stopped 
on the runway and overran the end. It came to rest some 130 meters from the runway end after 
having struck an ILS antenna and the airport perimeter fence. The maximum take off weight 
was exceeded by some 9,729 kg (+16%) for the conditions at Quito. It was determined after the 
accident that the crew had not calculated the weight and balance for the flight. Instead they had 
used the load sheet from a previous flight.  
 
Example 2: Exceedance of aft centre of gravity limit during landing 
F27-600 (G-CHNL), Channel Express (Air Services) Ltd, Guernsey, Channel Islands, United 
Kingdom, 12/01/1999. (Source: AAIB UK) 
The aircraft was destroyed when it went out of control and crashed during the final stage of the 
approach to Runway 27 at Guernsey. After an uneventful flight, during the final stage of the 
approach, the pilot called for 'flaps forty' (the full down position) and the flaps were extended to 
this position.  Moments after the wing flaps were lowered to their fully down position, the nose 
of the aircraft rose and the crew were unable to prevent it rising further. The nose continued to 
rise until the aircraft's pitch attitude was near vertical. Although the crew applied nose down 
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pitch trim and high engine power, the aircraft lost flying speed, stalled and entered an incipient 
spin. Returning the flaps to the intermediate approach setting of 26.5° and raising the landing 
gear did not restore controllability. It descended in a shallow nose down pitch attitude with little 
forward speed and crashed at the rear of a private house, striking the house with its port wing. 
Both the house and the aircraft caught fire. The two pilots were killed but the sole occupant of 
the house escaped without physical injury.   
 
The aircraft was operating a flight from Luton with a cargo of three tonnes of newspapers.  Prior 
to departure, the cargo had to be hand loaded.  However, neither the load team leader nor the 
dispatcher had loaded an F.27 before nor did they have a load plan to assist them.  They 
therefore asked the captain how to proceed.  The captain reportedly replied along the lines 'from 
the back' or 'put it all in the rear.'  Subsequently the loading team stacked the papers in even 
piles, some 2ft. 6in. high, across the width of the cabin, working from a point in line with the 
rear doors forward.  The papers eventually extended forward for an estimated distance of 
between one quarter and one third of the length of the cabin.  As a result, the aircraft's centre of 
gravity ended up significantly aft of its approved limit and it became uncontrollable once full 
flap had been selected for landing. 
 
The crew of the aircraft appeared to have taken only limited interest in the loading.  The 
comments made by the investigators was that 'this behaviour contrasts strongly with the 
commander's careful manner and thorough attitude whilst actually flying' and suggests that 
'either he was not aware of the importance of load positioning and restraint or that he was not 
sure how to direct and supervise the loading operation.'  No official 'load planning' tables were 
provided for the flight crew to use.  Crews were apparently expected to devise a load plan by 
'trial and error' using the balance chart on the load sheet.  The investigators commented that this 
could be time consuming and not as error resistant as pre-planned tables.  Additionally, it was 
noted that loading procedures were not a structured element of the command training syllabus 
and there was therefore an element of chance that new commanders might not be properly 
trained in this area. This accident was provoked by operating the aircraft outside the cleared 
load and balance limitations. This error went undetected because nobody ensured that the cargo 
distribution in the aircraft was the same as that shown on the load and balance sheet. 
 
Example 3: Exceedance of forward centre of gravity limit during take off 
Convair 880, N5865, Air Trine, Miami International Airport, USA, 16/12/1976 (source: NLR 
Air Safety Database/NTSB) 
The Convair 880 was loaded with a cargo of cows. Following an apparently normal take off run 
on Runway 09L reaching the rotation speed, the aircraft would not rotate despite repeated 
efforts by the crew including re-trimming the aircraft to the 'full nose-up' position. The pilot 
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subsequently elected to abort the take off but was unable to bring the aircraft to a stop before the 
end of the runway.  After leaving the runway, the aircraft passed over an area of soft ground, 
where its nose undercarriage collapsed, before falling into a wide drainage canal. The 
investigation determined that on take off the aircraft's centre of gravity was some 2.2% of the 
mean aerodynamic chord in front of the maximum forward limit, due to the way the aircraft had 
been loaded, and that the crew's weight and balance calculations bore no resemblance to the 
way the weight was actually distributed. 
 
Example 4: Overweight take off with an exceedance of forward centre of gravity limit 
B727-200, 3X-GDO, Union des Transports Africains, Cotonou, Bénin, 25-12-2003 (source: 
BEA Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la Sécurité de l'Aviation Civile, report translation 
3x-o031225a) 
On December 25th, 2003, a Boeing 727 operated by the Union des Transports Africains (UTA) 
crashed during take off from Cotonou. There were at least 160 people on board and only 22 
survived. Passenger boarding and baggage loading was carried out in great confusion. For flight 
preparation, incomplete information on the loading was provided to the Captain. He had 
determined the configuration for take off on the basis of this information. The investigation 
showed that, after the brakes were released, the aircraft accelerated up to rotation speed. As the 
forward hold had been filled, the aircraft had a significant forward centre of gravity that the 
crew had not compensated for with the stabiliser because they had not been informed of the 
loading of this hold. The pilot's nose-up input thus did not have an immediate effect and it took 
seven seconds for the aircraft to leave the ground, with a very low slope angle. The aircraft hit a 
building located on the extended runway centreline, crashed onto the beach and ended up in the 
ocean. The investigation also showed that, without the uncompensated forward centre of 
gravity, the aircraft would have taken off despite its excess weight. The investigation concluded 
that the accident was due to the crew's difficulties in performing the rotation with an overloaded 
aircraft with a forward centre of gravity that they were unaware of. 
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4 Onboard Aircraft Weight and balance Systems 
The majority (more than 90%) of weight and balance problems identified in this paper could be 
eliminated if there was a system available to the flight crew that would do an automatic onboard 
weight and balance assessment. In the past accident investigation boards have often 
recommended the development of such primary6 onboard weight and balance systems. For 
instance the NTSB recommended to conduct or sponsor research to develop systems that are 
capable of delivering actual aircraft weight and balance data before flight dispatch after the 
accident with a Beech 1900D that occurred on January 8, 2003. Another example is the 
recommendation made by the French BEA after the accident with a B727-200 operated by UTA 
(Union des Transports Africains) on 25 December 2003. The BEA stated that “knowing the true 
weight and balance of the airplane would most likely have enabled the crew to avoid the 
accident. In addition, erroneous estimates of these parameters are quite likely during 
operations. Onboard autonomous systems are, however, available and they give an indication 
of the airplane's weight and balance that is sufficient to attract the crew's attention in case of an 
abnormal situation. Consequently, the BEA recommends that: the civil aviation authorities, in 
particular the FAA in the United States and the EASA in Europe, modify the certification 
requirements so as to ensure the presence, on new generation airplanes to be used for 
commercial flights, of onboard systems to determine weight and balance, as well as recording 
of the parameters supplied by these systems; the civil aviation authorities put in place the 
necessary regulatory measures to require, where technically possible, retrofitting on airplanes 
used for commercial flights of such systems and the recording of the parameters supplied.” 
 
Attempts to develop an onboard weight and balance system go back to the 1940’s. 
Unfortunately, many of those attempts failed to deliver a system that was accurate and reliable 
enough to be used as a primary system. Therefore implementation of onboard weight and 
balance systems has been limited. In 1998, an evaluation of the reliability of onboard weight 
and balance systems conducted by the FAA showed that (cargo) operators had concerns with 
onboard weight and balance systems. Operators noted reliability problems resulting in 
unnecessary delays and maintenance burden. However, their biggest concern was with the 
accuracy of the system. Large differences were noted between the centre of gravity position 
determined by the onboard systems and the centre of gravity position determined by the 
operator’s primary weight and balance method. These large differences and the reliability 
problems resulted in a lack of confidence in the system by the flight crew. These issues 
generally result from the wide range of the operating environment the onboard systems have to 
deal with. In many cases the system was deactivated by the operators due to these reliability and 
                                                     
6 This means that this system is used by the operator as its primary means of calculating weight and balance. 
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accuracy problems. Therefore the FAA stated (in 1998) that the results of its evaluation did not 
support imposing a requirement to install a system that displays airplane weight and balance and 
gross weight in the cockpit of transport-category cargo airplanes.  
 
Specifications drafted for onboard weight and balance systems state that the system shall be 
capable of measuring the gross weight within an accuracy of 1% and the aircraft centre of 
gravity within 1% of the mean aerodynamic chord (see FAA AC-120-27E). For a large jumbo 
jet with a mean aerodynamic chord of 8.3 meter this would mean that the system shall be 
accurate within 83 mm. The system must also self-detect any fault which would significantly 
degrade the accuracy, so that the probability of an undetected catastrophic fault is less than 1 in 
a billion flight hours. It is clear that these requirements are very though demands for a primary 
onboard weight and balance system. Also maintainability of the system is often a problem. This 
is something that cannot be ignored if an onboard weight and balance system is to become 
successful.  
 
The most typical onboard weighing system consist of a set of strain sensing transducers in each 
main wheel and nose wheel axle, a weight and balance computer, and an indicator of the ground 
attitude of the aircraft. The strain sensors measure the amount each axle deflects and send these 
data into the computer, where signals from all of the transducers and the ground attitude sensor 
are integrated. The technical aspects of onboard aircraft weighing systems are too complex to 
discuss here in great detail. However, it can be easily understood that designing a certifiable 
primary onboard weight and balance system that works with high a reliability and accuracy 
under various harsh conditions (high and low temperatures for instance) is very difficult. 
Despite these difficulties, systems (not primary) for onboard aircraft weighing are available for 
a number of (mainly) large transport aircraft such as the Boeing B747-400, the MD-11 and the 
Airbus A300, A320, A330/340. In the NLR Air Safety Database there are a number of examples 
of incidents in which onboard weight and balance systems saved the day. Indeed an accurate 
onboard weight and balance system can help in mitigating most weight and balance related 
occurrences.  However, some example incidents also showed their weakness if they are not 
properly used. New patents are filled regularly for onboard weight and balance assessment 
systems showing that the ideal system has not been developed yet. Still these systems are often 
too expensive to be introduced on all aircraft types and for now they are mostly used on large 
aircraft. However a secondary weight and balance systems could still be of some value in 
preventing weight and balance related accidents. On some civil transport aircraft such secondary 
systems are standard. 
 
The advances of a primary onboard weighing system go further than safety only. In fact the 
operator can gain more operational flexibility and reduce cost. In theory a primary onboard 
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weight and balance system should measure the actual weight and centre of gravity location of an 
aircraft. As a result an operator may not need to include certain curtailments to the loading 
envelope to account for variables such as passenger seating variation or variation in passenger 
weight giving more flexibility. However, an operator still needs to curtail the loading envelope 
for any system tolerances that may result in centre of gravity or weight errors. 
 
As an alternative to onboard systems there are efforts to develop systems to rapidly weigh and 
automatically track passenger and baggage weight and location data as passengers board 
aircraft. The rapid development in different technological advances such as hand-held devices 
and wireless bar code scanners indicate that it may be feasible to compile actual weight data and 
account for the weight location, which can result in a reliable calculation of actual aircraft 
weight and balance. 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
The following conclusions are made: 
 
• The risk of having a weight and balance related accident with cargo flights is 8.5 times 
higher than with passenger flights; 
 
• There are various factors involved in weight and balance accidents/incidents such as errors 
in the load sheet, shifting of cargo, incorrect loading etc. No single factor could be 
identified in the present study that had a very dominant influence. However, load sheet 
errors, incorrect loading, and shifting of cargo seem to be the most important factors. 
Typically root causes to weight and balance related occurrences are poor communication, 
time pressure, poor quality assurance within the ground agents’ organisation, lack of 
training of flight/cabin crew, lack of training of ground agents’ personnel and poor loading 
procedures. 
 
• Large regional differences in the weight and balance related accident rate are identified. 
The African region showed the highest accident rate and the North American region the 
lowest; 
 
• Worldwide the weight and balance related accident rate shows a slow improvement since 
1970. Nevertheless the accident rate has reduced by all most 50% in 35 years; 
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• The amount of time spent on training of weight and balance related items are often limited 
both for flight crew as well as with ground agents. The analysed occurrence data show that 
better and more frequent training could help in avoiding weight and balance problems; 
 
• Primary onboard aircraft weight and balance systems could resolve most of the weight and 
balance problems identified in the present study. However the accuracy and reliability of 
such systems is currently insufficient to enforce the use of these systems on commercial 
aircraft as primary means for determining the weight and balance. However secondary 
weight and balance systems could still be of some value in preventing weight and balance 
related accidents. 
 
 
Recommended reading material 
The following documents are recommended to anybody how wants to get more background 
information on aircraft weight and balance issues: 
 
• Getting to grips with weight and balance, Flight Operations Support & Line Assistance, 
Airbus, 2004. 
 
• Aircraft Weight and Balance Handbook, FAA, FAA-H-8083-1, 1999. 
 
• Aircraft weight and balance control, FAA advisory circular, AC-120-27D, 2004. 
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